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Abstract
This paper proposes three measures of average exit time from catastrophic
health payments; the rst measure is non-normative in that the weights placed
on catastrophic payments incurred by poor and nonpoor households are the same.
It ignores the fact that the opportunity cost of health spending is di¤erent be-
tween poor and nonpoor households. The other two measures allow for distribution
sensitivity but di¤er in their conceptualization of inequality; one is based on so-
cioeconomic inequalities in catastrophic health payments, and the other uses pure
inequalities in catastrophic health payments. The proposed measures are then ap-
plied to Malawian data from the Third Integrated Household Survey. The empirical
results show that when the threshold of pre-payment income is increased from 5%
to 15%, the average exit time decreases from 2.1 years to 0.2 years; and as the
catastrophic threshold rises from 10% to 40% of ability to pay, the average exit
time falls from 3.6 years to 0.1 years. It is found that when socioeconomic inequal-
ity is adopted, the changes in the exit times are quite small, however, using pure
inequality leads to large reductions in the exit time.
Keywords: Catastrophic payments; average exit time; Malawi
1 Introduction
The reliance on out-of-pocket payments (OOP) is a dominant feature of health care -
nance in most developing countries; and this means that households especially poor ones,
face a di¢ cult intertemporal choice between diverting resources towards medical care
now, or foregoing treatment at the expense of depreciating their human capital. OOP
payments on health care can be catastrophic if they severely disrupt household living
standards. Such catastrophic payments can threaten living standards either in the short
term through the sacrice of current consumption, or in the long term, through depletion
of assets, dissavings or accumulation of debts (Xu et al., 2003; Russell, 2004; Wagsta¤,
2006; Sparrow et al., 2013).The nancial protection of households from catastrophic pay-
ments is a widely accepted conception of fairness in health nance (WHO, 2000, 2010).
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Besides, catastrophic health care payments have motivated calls on governments to move
to some kind of pre-payment mechanism such as taxes or universal medical insurance
(WHO, 2005).
Similar to the poverty measurement problem (Sen, 1976), the methodology for mea-
suring catastrophic OOP health payments, can be broken down into two stages: (i) the
identication of individuals or households incurring catastrophic medical expenditures,
and (ii) the aggregation of all the individuals or households into an overall indicator that
quanties the extent of catastrophic health payments. In the identication stage, out-
of-pocket medical spending is dened as catastrophic if it exceeds a certain amount in
monetary terms (e.g. Waters et al., 2004) or alternatively, health spending is considered
catastrophic if it exceeds some fractional threshold of pre-payment income or ability to
pay income (e.g. Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer, 2003; Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). The
aggregation stage, as developed by Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer (2003), includes measures
of the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health payments, and measures that reect
the fact that catastrophic health payments matter more for the poor.
This paper focuses on the aggregation stage, and develops measures which answer the
following question: how long would it take for those individuals or households that incur
catastrophic health payments to exit from their catastrophic situation? Specically, this
paper proposes three measures of average exit time from catastrophic health payments;
the rst measure assumes away the distribution of catastrophic payments, and therefore
ignores the fact that the opportunity cost of health spending is di¤erent between poor
and nonpoor households. The other two measures allow for distribution sensitivity but
di¤er in their conceptualization of inequality; one is based on socioeconomic inequalities in
catastrophic health payments, and the other uses pure inequalities in catastrophic health
payments.
As has been argued by Morduch (1998), the average exit time is meaningful in the
sense that it describes an interesting "if-then" relationship, and it is based on "best case"
assumptions. Although, the measures are static in nature, their usefulness lies in the fact
that they provide a simple metric by which to assess the potential for policy to reduce
catastrophic health payments through the reduction in the health payments budget share.
The proposed measures of average exit time are then applied to Malawian data from the
Third Integrated Household Survey.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents measures for
capturing exit time from catastrophic health payments. Section 3 provides a description
of the Malawian context, and data used in the empirical application. Results of the
application are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers conclusions.
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2 Exit from Catastrophic Health Payments
Let fi be per capita expenditure on food of household i, ci be per capita annualized
household expenditure, then yi = ci fi is a households ability to pay for health. Dene
the fraction of health spending (hi) in a households ability to pay for health as vi =
hi
yi
2 (0; 1): Conventionally, a households health payments are considered catastrophic if
vi > z; where z 2 (0; 1) is a threshold above which spending on health is considered
catastrophic (Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer, 2003). One can alternatively dene the frac-
tion of health spending in pre-payment income which is per capita annualized household
expenditure gross of food expenditure. Following Morduch (1998), I dene the exit time
from catastrophic health payments for a household as the time it will take the household
to reach a catastrophic health payments threshold through a decay/decline in the propor-
tion of health spending. Assuming the share of health payments declines at a constant
negative rate of g every year, then the relationship between the threshold z; and the
proportion of current health spending can be expressed as
z = vie
 tig (1)
Taking logarithms, and solving for ti gives
ti =   ln z   ln vi
g
(2)
Using ln ~z   ln ~vi, dene a new variable as follows
mi =
(
jln z   ln vij if ln z   ln vi  0
0 if ln z   ln vi > 0
(3)
Thus , mi is a catastrophic overshoot. Using this new variable, the exit time from
catastrophic health payments for each household can be re-written as
ti =
mi
g
(4)
Equation (4) says that the exit time for those households that do not su¤er from catastrophic
health payments is zero. The average exit time from catastrophic health payments can
then be found by taking a weighted average of ti
Tg =
1
g
 PN
i wimiPN
i wi
!
(5)
=
W
g
3
Where W =
PN
i wimiPN
i wi
is the Watts Index (Watts, 1968), wi is the survey sampling
weight of each household, and
PN
i wi = N is the total number of households in the
sample. Equation (5) shows that the average exit time is just equal to the catastrophic
payments Watts Index divided by the growth rate of the proportion of health spending.
One might wish to place a normative interpretation on the exit time, such that more
weight is given to excess OOPs incurred by poorer households. The average exit time
derived above is insensitive to the distribution of catastrophic payments in the sense that
all households exceeding the threshold regardless of whether they are poor or rich are
treated equally. The opportunity cost of health spending may not be the same between
poor and rich households (ODonnell et al., 2008), and the average exit time needs to
reect this di¤erential opportunity cost. To address this problem, I weight mi by weights
dened by Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer (2003). Let ri denote household is absolute rank
in ascending order of per capita consumption expenditure, a proxy for household income.
This is equal to 1 for the poorest household, 2 for the second poorest household, and N
for the richest household. The weights are dened as
si = 2
N + 1  ri
N
(6)
Thus, si = 2 for the poorest household i.e. ri = 1 , and si = 2N for the richest household
i.e. ri = N: Taking a weighted average of the weighted household level exit times simi,
gives the distribution-sensitive average exit time from catastrophic health payments as
TCg =
1
g
 PN
i wisimiPN
i wi
!
=
1
g
"
2PN
i wi
NX
i=1

1 +
1
N
 Ri

wimi
#
(7)
=
"
2
W
g
  1
g
 
2PN
i wi
NX
i=1
Riwimi
!#
if N is large
where Ri = riN 2 [0; 1] is the households relative fractional rank. The second term in
equation (7) can further be simplied by using the formula for a concentration index C
by Kakwani et. al. (1997) expressed as
C =
2
NW
NX
i=1
Riwimi   1 (8)
To get
W (1 + C) =
2
N
NX
i=1
Riwimi (9)
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Substituting equation (9) into equation (7) gives a distribution-sensitive average exit time
from catastrophic health payments in terms of the concentration index
TCg = Tg(1  C))
If the poor and the rich are equally likely to exceed the catastrophic payments threshold,
then C = 0, and TCg = Tg: If poor households tend to exceed the catastrophic payments
threshold, C will be negative, and TCg > Tg: This means that Tg will understate the average
exit time. If better-o¤ households tend to exceed the threshold, C will be positive, and
TCg < Tg: This suggests that Tg will overstate the average exit time.
The above distribution-sensitive average exit time shows income-related inequalities
in catastrophic health payments. The average exit can also be expressed in terms of pure
or total inequalities in health payments as measured by a Gini coe¢ cient G of the variable
s0imi: The average exit time in terms of the Gini coe¢ cient can be dened analogously
to the exit time in terms of the concentration index as
TGg = Tg(1 G)) (10)
where all other variables are as dened before but a new weight s0i and not si is used
instead. For s0i, households are ranked in ascending order of mi, and not in terms of
per capita consumption expenditure. If all households are equally likely to overshoot the
catastrophic threshold i.e. G = 0, then the distribution-neutral average exit time Tg is
equal to the distribution-sensitive average exit time, TGg . If few households are more likely
to su¤er from catastrophic health payments, then G will be close to one, and TGg < Tg:
This implies that Tg will overestimate the average exit time.
The above measures suggest that the distribution-sensitive average exit time from
catastrophic health spending can nest either the concentration index or the Gini coe¢ -
cient. Morduch (1998) shows that the distribution-sensitive average exit time from poverty
nests the Theil-L index of inequality. In terms of the relationship between the exit time
and the rate of decay, two things are noteworthy. First, the rates of decay, g which would
achieve a given average exit time from catastrophic health spending are given as: g = W
Tg
;
g = W (1 C)
TCg
; g = W (1 G)
TGg
for the distribution neutral, income-related inequality, and pure
inequality adjusted average exit time respectively. This means that if the targeted average
exit time was one year for instance, then the required growth rates would be: g = W;
g = W (1  C) ; and g = W (1 G) respectively.
Second, incremental changes in the average exit time following changes in g are ex-
pressed as: @Tg
@g
=  W
g2
< 0;
@TCg
@g
=  W (1 C)
g2
< 0;
@TGg
@g
=  W (1 G)
g2
< 0: This implies
that when the rate of decay increases (in absolute value), the average exit time decreases.
The rate of decay is policy amenable; for instance rolling out universal health insurance,
subsidized or free health care would ensure that the share of OOP on health care in the
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budget declines i.e. rate of decay increases, and this would in turn lead to a decrease in
the exit time from catastrophic health payments.
3 Empirical Application to Malawi
3.1 Context
The health nance system in Malawi comprises the government, foreign donors, private
individuals and players through direct OOP payments, and medical insurance. Donor
funding dominates total health expenditure in Malawi. For example, over the period,
2005-2009, donor contributions accounted for an average of 60% of total health expen-
diture. Donor contributions rose from 46% to 66% of total health expenditure between
2002/03 and 2008/09, while the share public sector domestic nancing decreased from
35% to 18%. Household health expenditure shares in total health expenditures, mar-
ginally declined from 12.2% in 2002/03 to about 11% in 2008/09 (World Bank, 2013).
Malawi has no social medical insurance, and private medical insurance, plays a mar-
ginal role as a source of health care nance; for instance, private health insurance man-
aged an average of 3% of total health spending between 2007 and 2009 (GOM, 2012).
The limited availability of private health insurance is unlikely to change in a signicant
way. Malawi has a small formal sector from which health insurance premiums could be
collected with relative ease. Besides, the informal sector is characterised by low wages
and salaries. The presence of a predominantly free public health care system distorts the
incentive for households to insure against unexpected illness and the consequent medical
costs (GOM, 2012).
The heavy reliance on donor funding to nance health expenditure is unsustainable
and leaves Malawi in a vulnerable position to external shocks such as aid suspension,
and nancial crises in donor economies. For instance, the execution of donor pledges was
a¤ected by the global nancial crisis which started in 2008 such that in 2011/12 only 25%
of pledges were released (World Bank, 2013). This risk is further compounded by the fact
that pre-payment mechanisms such as taxes or universal medical insurance have limited
scope for growth in Malawi. All this then points to a strong possibility that going forward,
Malawis health care nancing system will shift towards full cost recovery or cost sharing
arrangements. This in turn suggests that in order to mitigate against the nancing risks,
and although the share of OOP health care spending is relatively, it is likely to increase
rather than decrease in the future.
3.2 Data description and thresholds
The data used in the paper come from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) con-
ducted by Malawis National Statistical O¢ ce (NSO). The survey is statistically designed
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to be representative at both national, district, urban and rural levels. It was conducted
from March 2010 to March 2011. The survey collected information from a sample of
12271 households. The information collected includes socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics of households and individual household members. It also collected data on
OOP health care payments to cover: medicines (including non-prescription medicines),
tests, consultation, cost of travel to a medical facility, in-patient fees, preventative health
care, pre-natal visits, check-ups, out-patient costs, and hospitalization costs including the
cost of stay at a traditional healers or faith healers dwelling. I consider the household
as the unit of analysis.
Since the data were collected from di¤erent locations and times of the year, the
consumption and health care payments are converted into real values by using a temporal
and spatial deator. I use two measures to capture the share of OOP heath care payments;
one is the share of OOP in household pre-payment income as proxied by per capita
annualized household consumption, gross of OOP health payments, and the other is the
share of health spending in a households nondiscretionary expenditure or capacity to pay
(Xu et al., 2003; Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer, 2003), which is dened as per capita total
household expenditure net of per capita expenditure on food. I use di¤erent thresholds to
identify catastrophic health payments; heath care payments are considered catastrophic
if the shares exceed these thresholds.
As argued by ODonnell et al.(2008), researchers should not impose their own judg-
ment but rather should present results for a range of values of the threshold, and let the
reader choose where to give more weight. The exact threshold that one ends up using is
arbitrary, but it depends on whether the denominator is total expenditure or nondiscre-
tionary expenditure. The paper adopts a number of thresholds as follows: 5%, 10%, and
15% for OOP as share of total household expenditure, and 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% for
OOP as share of capacity to pay. It should be pointed out that the existing literature,
commonly uses 10% as a threshold when total expenditure is used as the denominator
(e.g. Pradhan and Prescott 2002; Ranson 2002; Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer 2003), and
40% when nondiscretionary expenditure is used as the denominator (e.g. Xu et al., 2003).
4 Results
4.1 OOP shares and catastrophic payments
Before looking at average exit time results, I rst discuss the pattern and prevalence of
catastrophic OOP health care payments. Table 1 reports results for OOP payments as a
percentage of total household expenditure, and total non-food expenditure. As would be
expected, the results indicate that the mean of the share of ability to pay is larger than
that for the share of pre-payment income. A similar pattern is observed for the median.
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The distributions of the shares of OOP are positively skewed with the mean about ten
times the median. The asymmetry in the distribution of the shares is further conrmed
by the Gini coe¢ cients which are about 0.8; suggesting that few households register high
OOP shares.
The coe¢ cient of variations for the OOP shares are greater than two, and this implies
that OOP payments are highly unpredictable. The concentration index of the OOP share
of pre-payment income is positive, while it is negative for the OOP share of ability to
pay. The di¤erences in the direction of the relationship between the two OOP shares
and household economic status conform to what is expected in a low-income country like
Malawi (van Doorslaer et al., 2007). This is because in ability to pay, food which is a
necessity, is removed from the denominator, and this in turn means that the OOP share
of non-food expenditure decreases as the level of non-food expenditure increases.
Table 2 shows the catastrophic payment headcount, which measures the incidence (in
percentage) of catastrophic payments, and the mean positive overshoot (MPO), which cap-
tures the intensity or gap of the occurrence of households incurring catastrophic payments
(see Wagsta¤ and Van Doorslaer (2003) for more details). The results also include the
mean overshoot- which is the incidence times the intensity- and two additional measures
that reect not only the incidence and intensity but also the distribution of catastrophic
payments. As expected, for both OOP shares, the incidence and intensity of catastrophic
payments declines as the threshold rises. When the threshold is increased from 5% to 15%
of total expenditure, the incidence of catastrophic payments declines from about 6.9% to
1.1%.
Further to this, the MPO for OOP payments in excess of 5% of the household budget
is 5.7%, and it is 9.5% for those that spend more than 15% of total expenditure on health
care. This means that households that spend more than 5% of total expenditure on health
care, on average spend 10.7% (5% + 5.7%), and those that spend in excess of 15% of the
household budget on health care, on average spend 34.5% (25% +9.5%). As expected,
for a given threshold, the incidence and intensity of catastrophic payments are higher
when the share of ability to pay is used; and the headcounts range from about 11.3%
to about 1%, and the MPOs range from 11.2% to 12.9%. This for instance, means that
amongst households spending more than 40% of ability to pay on OOP payments, the
average OOP share exceeds this threshold by 11.8 percentage points, which in turn gives
a 51.8% OOP budget share.
For both OOP shares, there is a direct proportionality between the concentration
index of catastrophic payment indicators and thresholds; and this suggests that health
care payments are a luxury good. A similar pattern is displayed between the concentration
index of payment overshoots and thresholds. Consequently, the rank-weighted headcount
and intensity measures which reect distribution sensitivity in OOP are progressively
lower as one increases the thresholds. This implies that catastrophic OOPs are incurred
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relatively more by nonpoor households, and that the inequality unadjusted measures of
catastrophic payments overstate the incidence and intensity of catastrophic payments.
The preceding discussion has shown that the prevalence of catastrophic health payments
is relatively high considering that Malawi operates a largely free public health system.
The existence of catastrophic health care payments can have adverse consequences on the
a¤ected households such as the reduction in current consumption and/or the accumulation
of debt or the depletion of savings and assets with long-term consequences for household
welfare (van Doorslaer et al., 2007).
4.2 Exit from catastrophic payments
I now turn to the illustration of the average exit time from catastrophic payments devel-
oped in this paper. The average exit time is illustrated below for a hypothetical constant
and uniform decay rate of -2%. Table 3 displays results of the three measures of average
exit time for di¤erent thresholds of the OOP shares of pre-payment income, and of ability
to pay. For both shares, the results indicate that the average exit time declines as the
threshold rises. This is in conformity with the incidence and intensity results discussed be-
fore, and it is expected because a higher threshold denotes a more stringent classication
of OOP payments as catastrophic.
The average exit times for the OOP share of ability to pay are higher than those for
pre-payment income. When the threshold of pre-payment income is increased from 5%
to 15%, the average exit time decreases from 2.1 years to 0.2 years. As the catastrophic
threshold rises from 10% to 40% of ability to pay, the average exit time falls from 3.6 years
to 0.1 years. For the same threshold, 10% in this case, the average exit of the OOP share
of ability to pay is longer than that for pre-payment income. This pattern is consistent
with what was seen earlier for the incidence and intensity measures. Overall, the exit
times are clearly short, this is however to be expected considering that the prevalence and
intensity of catastrophic payments in Malawi is very low.
The concentration indices of the overshoot, m are all positive; implying that nonpoor
households are more likely to overshoot the catastrophic health payments thresholds than
poor households. Consequently, attaching a normative interpretation to the exit times
leads to even shorter exit times for both OOP shares and all thresholds. It is also worth
noting that the concentration indices are not quantitatively substantial. This means that
the extent to which the overshoots are prevalent among the nonpoor is not pronounced. A
result of this is that the declines in the average exit times are marginal. For instance, after
adjusting for socioeconomic inequalities in catastrophic payments, the average exit time
marginally declines from 2.13 years to 2.08 years for those that exceed the 5% threshold
of pre-payment income, and it minimally drops from 3.56 years to 3.54 years for those
with OOP shares of ability to pay in excess of 10%. Interestingly, the null hypothesis that
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the concentration indices are equal to zero is rejected (results not reported in the table);
suggesting that the concentration indices are statistically signicant but economically
insignicant.
I now turn to pure inequalities of the overshoots as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient.
The results indicate that for the two OOP shares and all thresholds, the coe¢ cients are
almost equal to one; specically the coe¢ cients range from 0.929 to 0.994. This means
that only few households face catastrophic health care payments. When the average
exit time is adjusted for this high pure inequality in the distribution of catastrophic
payments, it substantially drops. For instance, households that exceed the 10% threshold
of pre-payment income, their average exit time decreases from 0.573 years to 0.007 years.
The equivalent change for ability to pay is that it falls from 3.556 years to 0.254 years.
Thus, adjusting the average exit time for inequality crucially depends on what concept
of inequality is used. When socioeconomic inequality is adopted, the changes in the exit
times are quite small, however, using pure inequality leads to large reductions in the exit
times.
The above results are based on the arbitrary growth rate of -2%; Figure 1 shows
distribution-neutral average exit times for di¤erent thresholds and growth rates. The
growth rates range from -9% to -1%. The gure shows a clear ranking in the average exit
times by threshold; for any given growth rate, curves for lower thresholds are everywhere
above those for higher thresholds. This means that the lower the threshold, the longer
it takes to exit from catastrophic health payments. As would be expected, decreases (in
absolute value) in the growth rate are associated with increases in the average exit time.
Regardless of the growth rate used, and when the same threshold of 10% is adopted, the
exit times are longer for the OOP share of ability to pay than the OOP share of pre-
payment income. A similar picture is observed for the distribution-sensitive average exit
times (gure not reported).
What growth rate is needed in order to exit in one year? The measures developed
in this paper can also be used to provide answers to this question. Results in Table 4
show the relationship between exiting from catastrophic health payments in one year,
and the growth rate necessary to achieve that. For both OOP shares, there is a negative
relationship (in absolute value) between growth rates required to exit in one year, and
thresholds. For example, as the threshold for the OOP of pre-payment income rises from
5% to 15%, the growth rate decreases from 4.25% to 0.469%. Two things are noteworthy:
(i) the growth rates are lower (in absolute value) when distribution sensitivity is imposed,
and (ii) they are higher (in absolute value) for the OOP share of ability to pay. This means
that for households to exit from catastrophic payments in a year, the required growth
rate would be smaller if one takes into account the distribution of catastrophic payments;
and the required growth rate would be higher if one considers catastrophic OOP health
payments in terms of householdstotal expenditure net of discretionary expenses.
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5 Concluding Comments
The paper has proposed three measures of average exit time from catastrophic health
payments; the rst measure is distribution-insensitive in that it does not account for the
fact that the opportunity cost of health spending is di¤erent between poor and nonpoor
households. The other two measures reect distribution sensitivity; a key di¤erence is
that one is based on socioeconomic inequalities in catastrophic health payments, and the
other uses pure inequalities in catastrophic health payments. The proposed measures have
been illustrated by using Malawian data from the Third Integrated Household Survey.
The empirical illustration has shown that the when threshold of pre-payment income
is increased from 5% to 15%, the average exit time decreases from 2.1 years to 0.2 years;
and as the catastrophic threshold rises from 10% to 40% of ability to pay, the average
exit time falls from 3.6 years to 0.1 years. Using the same threshold, 10% in this case,
the average exit of the OOP share of ability to pay is longer than that for pre-payment
income. It has been shown that adjusting the average exit time for inequality crucially
depends on what concept of inequality is used. When socioeconomic inequality is adopted,
the changes in the exit times are quite small, however, using pure inequality leads to large
reductions in the exit time.
The proposed measures have useful policy relevance in that public policy can be used
to inuence the growth rate/decay of the share of OOP health care payments. E¤orts
to introduce pre-payment mechanisms such as private or public insurance would lead to
declines in OOP shares which in turn means that the prevalence, and hence, the exit
times from catastrophic health payments would be reduced. The measures can therefore
be used to perform scenarios analysis on di¤erent exit times and the growth rates required
to attain them.
Two caveats are worth noting regarding the measures developed in this paper. First,
the average exit time is based on best case assumptions, such as that there is a uniform
and constant decay rate in OOP shares, which may not hold in reality. Second, the
measures are no di¤erent from conventional measures of the incidence and intensity of
catastrophic health spending in terms of how catastrophic payments are dened and
identied. The conventional measures have been criticised for their failure to capture the
following: cost barriers to access; di¤erences in health care utilization by ability to pay;
protection inadequacies for poor individuals; measures of illness vulnerability; degrees of
nancial protection and coverage; informal treatment payments; debt or credit nancing
of health care expenditures; reduced consumption of other household necessities; and the
indirect costs of illness and strategies of coping with direct and indirect costs of illness
(see Ruger (2012) for more details). The inability of the proposed measures to account
for these problems means that the average exit times may actually be underestimated.
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Table 1. OOP payments for health care as a percentage of household consumption
Statistic Share of pre-payment income Share of ability to pay
Mean 1.35 3.69
Median 0.13 0.34
Coefficient of variation 2.50 2.10
Concentration index 0.01 -0.01
Gini coefficient 0.79 0.77
Observations 12271 12271
Note: sample weights are applied in the computation of all statistics to give population estimates
Table 2. Headcount and gap of catastrophic OOP health care payments
Threshold level 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40%
(a) Share of pre-payment income
Headcount measures
Headcount 6.89% 2.48% 1.08%
Concentration index -0.01 0.02 0.08
Rank weighted headcount 6.96% 2.43% 1.00%
Gap measures
Mean overshoot 0.40% 0.18% 0.10%
Concentration index 0.04 0.06 0.09
Rank weighted overshoot 0.38% 0.17% 0.09%
Mean positive overshoot 5.74% 7.43% 9.50%
(b) Share of ability to pay
Headcount measures
Headcount 11.33% 4.27% 2.01% 0.95%
Concentration index -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.05
Rank weighted headcount 11.62% 4.24% 1.90% 0.90%
Gap measures
Mean overshoot 1.26% 0.55% 0.25% 0.11%
Concentration index 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.06
Rank weighted overshoot 1.25% 0.53% 0.24% 0.11%
Mean positive overshoot 11.17% 12.87% 12.67% 11.80%
Observations 12271 12271 12271 12271 12271 12271
Note: sample weights are applied in the computation of all statistics to give population estimates
14
Table 3. Average exit time from catastrophic OOP health payments
Threshold 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40%
(a) Share of pre-payment income
Watts index 4.250 1.147 0.469
Growth rate -2.000 -2.000 -2.000
Average exit time 2.125 0.573 0.234
Concentration index of m 0.023 0.059 0.097
Rank-weighted average exit time 2.075 0.540 0.212
Gini coefficient  of m 0.957 0.987 0.994
Rank-weighted average exit time 0.091 0.007 0.001
(b) Share of ability to pay
Watts index 7.112 1.874 0.647 0.230
Growth rate -2.000 -2.000 -2.000 -2.000
Average exit time 3.556 0.937 0.324 0.115
Concentration index  of m 0.003 0.036 0.068 0.066
Rank-weighted average exit time 3.544 0.903 0.302 0.107
Gini coefficient  of m 0.929 0.973 0.987 0.994
Rank-weighted average exit time 0.254 0.025 0.004 0.001
Observations 12271 12271 12271 12271 12271 12271
Figure 1. Average exit times for di¤erent thresholds and growth rates
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Table 4. Exiting in one year, and corresponding growth rate
Threshold 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40%
(a) Share of pre-payment income
Growth rate -4.250 -1.147 -0.469
Growth rate (income-related inequality) -4.151 -1.079 -0.423
Growth rate (pure inequality) -0.183 -0.015 -0.003
(b) Share of ability to pay
Growth rate -7.112 -1.874 -0.647 -0.230
Growth rate (income-related inequality) -7.089 -1.807 -0.603 -0.215
Growth rate (pure inequality) -0.508 -0.051 -0.008 -0.001
Observations 12271 12271 12271 12271 12271 12271
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